When the French State works in startup mode
A public value approach to the French digital services incubator

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ABSTRACT :

As an answer to the calls asking for the adoption of alternative frameworks to NPM to study technology-enabled reforms, this paper analyses a radically new way of providing digital public services through the perspective of public value. Building on Moore's strategic triangle, this paper assesses whether the strategy developed by the French state startup incubator can deliver public value. After applying all three poles of Moore's paradigm – public value, legitimacy and support as well as operational capabilities – to the state startups, this essay paper concludes that state startups, if they succeed in the scaling-up phase, can be a very interesting and innovating way of delivering public value. Opening remarks bring the attention to some of the limits of this paper before proposing a way forward in the literature.

1. INTRODUCTION

In October 2015, 'state startups' were officially presented during the French Public Innovation Week (SGMAP, 2016). Hosted by a public incubator (beta.gouv.fr), they are part of the French state's efforts to simplify and modernize the administration, and constitute a new way of creating digital public services in France. They draw from startups approaches and methods, especially the agile methods (Pezziardi & Verdier, 2016) that focus on iterative processes and client's involvement. Thus, state startups can be identified as technology-enabled reforms (Cordella & Iannaci, 2010). If a large amount of the research conducted on technology-enabled reforms have been guided by the New Public Management (NPM) perspective (O'Flynn, 2007), calls have been made to adopt alternative frameworks in order to better capture the impacts of such reforms (Bonina & Cordella, 2012). Answering to this call, this study will adopt a public value perspective to the analysis of the French state startups and their incubator. More precisely, it will adopt Moore's strategic triangle (Moore, 1995) that aims at focusing "the attention of government managers on three complex issues" (Moore & Khagram, 2004, p. 1) they have to consider when designing and implementing policies. Indeed, due to the novelty of the incubator and startups, assessing their actual impact on the creation of public value would be problematic and inconclusive. Thus, this study will focus its analysis on the strategy developed by the incubator and its team to deliver public value based on the strategic triangle. This analysis could thus help answer the question of the extent to which the French state startups constitute a new way of delivering public value? The answer to this question seems to be that state startups, if they succeed in the scaling-up phase, can be a very interesting and innovating way of delivering public value.

To support this argument, the remainder of this study will unfold in the following fashion: section 2 reviews the literature on e-government studies and the emergence of alternatives to NPM before presenting the founding analytical framework ; section 3 sets the context of the study by presenting the state startups; section 4 analyses state startups based on Moore's strategic triangle ; and section 5 offers concluding remarks.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Literature review

Since the 1970s, a large movement of "government reinvention" has taken place and ICT have had a gradually significant role in these reforms (Heeks, 2001) leading to the emergence of e-government. In parrallel to the growing importance of e-government policies, academics took on this subject and research in e-government has grown dramatically (Heeks & Bailur, 2007; Yildiz, 2007). Despite the impressive amount of research in the subject, no single definition of the concept is accepted (Yildiz, 2007) A large part of the research on the topic has been focused on ICT has en enabler contributing to the creation of new and better services (Bekkers & Zouridis, 1999), as well as increasing efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public sector (Bertot, et al., 2010; Heeks & Davies, 1999). In these studies, most academics captured the subject through the lens of NPM (O'Flynn, 2007). This perspective was adopted because many reforms, especially in Anglo-Saxo, countries have actually been driven by this philosophy (O'Flynn, 2007). The NPM paradigm relies on the basic premise that "the market is good and the government is bad" (Heeks, 2001) leading to a rolling back of the state and the adoption of private sector methods and principles in the public sector (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). The delivery of services becomes result-driven and efficiency supersedes effectiveness.

Nevertheless, practitioners and scholars raised growing concerns about NPM, its failings and the benefits it actually brought to the citizens (O'Flynn, 2007; Fishenden & Thompson, 2012; Dunleavy, et al., 2006). This beginning of disillusionment has led to the emergence of alternatives to NPM including the public value paradigm (Greve, 2015; O'Flynn, 2007; Bonina & Cordella, 2012). The public value approach to e-government reforms draws significantly on the seminal work of Moore, who argued that creating public value must be the central activity of public managers (Moore, 1995). Several definitions of public value exist and it seems that no universal and absolute definition of the term can be given as "many of the

concepts embedded on the public values are ambiguous and unbounded" (Bonina & Cordella, 2009, p. 3). Following Cordella and Bonina's call for a better account of the public value perspective when studying information system adoption in the public sector (Bonina & Cordella, 2012), the public value paradigm and espacially Moore's strategic triangle (Moore, 1995) will be used as the basis for the analysis of the case study.

2.2. Conceptual framework

The main conceptual framework of this analysis will be Moore's strategic triangle (Moore, 1995) (Figure 1).

Figure 1 Moore's strategic triangle, adapted from Moore M. (1995) Creating Public Value

This strategic triangle aims at focusing "the attention of government managers on three complex issues" (Moore & Khagram, 2004, p. 1) they have to consider when designing and implementing policies.

Following this strategic framework, public managers have to ask themselves three questions (Moore & Khagram, 2004, p. 2):

- "What is the important **public value** the organization seek to produce?"
- "What sources of **legitimacy and support** will be relied upon to authorize the organization to take action and provide the resources necessary to sustain the effort to create that value?"
- "What operational capabilities will the organization rely on (or have to develop) to deliver the desired results?"

Thus, a governmental project must be "**substantively valuable** (…), **legitimate and politically sustainable** (…) [as well as] **operationally and administratively feasible**" (Moore, 1995). The first pole of the triangle is probably the most difficult to grasp. Indeed, as argued before, defining what is exactly meant by public value is a difficult endeavor. In his work, Moore made a parallel between private value or shareholder value (Moore, 1995). On his footsteps, academics expanded the definition. Perhaps one of the clearest definitions is the one developed by O'Flynn.

> *"Public value has been described*
> *as a multi-dimensional construct – a reflection*
> *of collectively expressed, politically mediated*
> *preferences consumed by the citizenry*
> *– created not just through 'outcomes' but also*
> *through processes which may generate trust*
> *or fairness" (O'Flynn, 2007, p. 358)*

Through this definition, she manages to present the two key features of public value: the production of something citizens value – the "outcomes" (i.e. better services, enhanced trust…) – and the collective aspect of public value. Indeed, one must know that public value is mostly defined by the citizens who consume it; and that citizens can value a service "for reasons that go beyond their individual self-interest" (Cordella, 2017, p. 25).

The two other poles of the strategic triangle are more straightforward. The legitimacy and support one implies that the organization must have the backing and money of the authority to which it is accountable (Moore, 1995). Finally, the operational capability one relies on the requirement to have or to be able to attract the resources needed for the desired outcomes as well as being able to make organizational changes when fit.

According to Moore public value can only be created when operational capability and the authorizing envrionement – legitimacy and support – work together. After presenting the case of interest to this study, Moore's strategic triangle will be applied to the French state startups to assess whether this innovative way of designing and delivering public service can constitute a strategy aimed at delivering public value.

3. THE CASE STUDY

3.1. To the origins of state startups

In December 2012, the French Interministerial Committee for the modernization of public action (CIMAP in French) urged the French ministries to collect information on citizens needs in order to simplify administrative procedures (European Commission, 2016). In this line, the French State tried to impulse a "simplifying shock" supposed to simplify relations between citizens, private companies and public administration and in November 2013, the French 'Simplification law' was voted (European Commission, 2016). Earlier, in June 2013, the French state experimented with a new way of constructing digital public services with the recasting of the public open data platform, data.gouv.fr. Following its success, the concept of state startups was expanded and their development is now handled by the digital services incubator, hosted by the Interministerial direction of digital and information and communications system (DINSIC in French) mission as part of the General Secretary for the modernization of public action (SGMAP in French) (SGMAP, 2017). It is currently headed by Henri Verdier.

What does the startup concept have to do with public sector administration? If quite classical in the private sector, the startup approach is currently developing in the French public administration. Of course, it is the approaches and methods – the agile method – that are being used and not the investment and maximum profitability private sector side of the startups (Pezziardi & Verdier, 2017). State startups are not privately funded and are not supposed to be privatized after their development. Imbued by the agile approach and users' experimentation (Pezziardi & Verdier, 2017), State startups aim to tackle the complexity of administrative procedures. In a country plagued by "blind bureaucracy" (Pezziardi & Verdier, 2017, p. 12) and where 75% of the administrative procedures still take place on paper, needless to say that French State startups are quite revolutionary (Pezziardi & Verdier, 2016).

Moreover, the revolutionary feature of the state startup approach is reinforced when contrasted with the recent path followed by the French state in terms of e-government. Indeed, many e-government projects developed by the French State failed or did not succeed in achieving their objectives (Louvet, 2017). Among them, we can cite the Louvois project or the SIRHEN. The former was supposed to facilitate the paying of the wages all the military corps with one unique software (Guisnel, 2016). The latter consisted in a renovation of the human resources information system of the French Ministry of Education (Fléchaux, 2015). Many e-government projects were stopped because of their scale – too big – and significant budget overruns, counted in millions of euros (Louvet, 2017), often due to externalisation. Such

cathedral project still exist in the French State and the startup mode is far from being the most used approach to e-government reform but, if proven to work, it might swarm.

3.2. State startups in practice

So far, almost thirty State startups have been developed or are in the process of development. They all follow the same path, from investigation to handover to a specific administration (SGMAP, 2017) where they autonomously run (Figure 2).

INVESTIGATION
- A public agent identifies a friction, an irritating procedure
- Evaluation of the relevance of the project (large target, efficiency and relevance of a digital service, obstacles)
- Team constitution

CONSTRUCTION
- Needs identification
- First prototype
- Continuous change of the proposition until one is kept
- Opening in bêta mode

CONSOLIDATION
- Lead users clients use and spread the service
- Continuous improvment of the service based on users' feedback

HANDOVER
- Validation of the service as sustainable
- Gradual transmission to the target administration
- The startup team may be transferred or training of the target administration team

AUTONOMY
- Service operated on the long-term by the target administration
- Ponctual help of the incubator if needed

Figure 2 The five stages of a state startup's life, adapted from beta.gouv.fr

Currently, the repartition of state startups according to their development phase is as follows (Table 1). They concern various public administrations and issues, from employment – with Pole Emploi, the French employment agency – to cities revegetation in partnership with the French Ministry of the environment going through specific benefits for disabled (SGMAP, 2017). Five of the startups are already in the last stages of development. Three of them are progressively handed over to their target administration (SGMAP, 2017):

- Boussole des droits (Rights compass), designed to help young people know their rights;

- MDPH en ligne (on-line MDPH), that enables disabled people to apply online for their benefits;

- Mes démarches Retraite (My Retirement administrative procedures), which, in partnership with three French retirement agencies, help workers prepare for their retirement.

Finally, both data.gouv.fr – the French open data platform – and OGP Toolbox – a social network aimed at finding and sharing digital tools to foster Open Government – are autonomously operated by their target administration, Etalab – the French data office (SGMAP, 2017).

Investigation	1
Construction	13
Consolidation	10
Handover	3
Autonomy	2
Closed	0
Dropped	0

Table 1 Repartition of state startups according to the development stages (as of April, 7th 2017)

What is interesting to note is that between the beginning of February, when research was started on this subject and now (beginning of April), the repartition of state startups evolved. The total number went from 27 to 29 and one startup went from handover to autonomy, as well as two others from consolidation to handover. This shows the very short time-frame within which state startups develop – the objective being to develop a working service in six months (Pezziardi & Verdier, 2017).

Based on small team of four to six members, a limited budget – around 200,000 € - and agile methods that promote autonomy, continuous improvement and trust, state startups constitute a totally new way to approach and design public administration and digital services (European Commission, 2016).

4. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE

The purpose of this study is to assess whether the state startup approach to designing and delivering public service can constitute a way to deliver public value. In order to do that, each pole of Moore's strategic triangle will be studied consecutively. Public value will be the first pole studied before turning our attention to the legitimacy and support they receive and finishing the analysis with the operational capabilities developed to support their action.

4.1. Public value

The first thing to consider is the notion of public value or the question of what is that the organization is trying to accomplish. Indeed, the strategy must be substantively valuable "in the sense that the organization produces things of value to overseers, clients, and beneficiaries" (Moore, 1995). Several approaches to the study of the impact of ICT on public value creation have been proposed in the literature (Bonina & Cordella, 2012) and Codagnone and Boccardelli have suggested that public value can be created in three main areas: "efficiency: organizational value; effectiveness: user value; and democracy: political value" (Bonina & Cordella, 2012, p. 517; Codagnone & Boccardelli, 2006). In the case of the state startups, one can argue that all three areas are at stake and are mutually reinforcing: from creating value for the citizens by reducing the administrative burden, to increasing the administration's efficiency by empowering grassroots employees, going through enhancing democracy by setting the conditions for government as a platform. State startups clearly aim at creating public value.

4.1.1. Effectiveness: user value

Indeed, one of the main objectives of the state startups is to create value for the citizens and organizations. As put by Matti Schneider, Product Manager at the state startup incubator and member of its permanent team, in an interview: a "state startup has a positive impact on the real world by resolving a friction, an irritating procedure" (Schneider, 2017). Most state startups have at their core, as their *raison d'être*, the aim to reduce the French administrative burden (SGMAP, 2016; SGMAP, 2017). The digital service is expected to "absorb administrative complexity" (Matti SCHNEIDER - Action publique et numérique, 2016).

To put it more clearly, let us take the example of the state startup *Mes-aides.gouv.fr*. This startup's purpose is to help a citizen know which social benefits he or she is entitled to. The friction or irritating procedure at stake is the one of non-use of social benefits. In 2008, 80% of the citizens entitled to a benefit for supplementary health insurance did not apply for this funding (Matti SCHNEIDER - Action publique et numérique, 2016). Among the reasons

identified for this gap were the difficulties to obtain information in a lack of thereof, troubles to fill in the application forms or the frequency of the applications to renew the benefit.

The first prototype of mes-aides.gouv.fr was posted online less than six months after the project began, in December 2014 (European Commission, 2016) and is currently in the consolidation stage[1]. The point was not to redesign entirely the French benefit system, but just to make it more accessible to citizens, to answer to a very specific need of the users (SGMAP, 2016). Now, in less than six minutes, users can estimate their rights to twenty-two social benefits (when the application was first launched, it was only seven) by answering very basic questions about their situation (Matti SCHNEIDER - Action publique et numérique, 2016). If users then still have to apply for the benefits (at least for now), they know what they are entitled to and who they have to reach out to.

This example clearly demonstrates that state startups have as their core objective a "requirement of a tangible improvement of the citizens' situation" (Pezziardi & Verdier, 2017, p. 16), and are thereby driven by the objective of creating public value.

4.1.2. Efficiency: organisational value

Another objective of state startups is to create organisational value by following an objective of efficiency. According to Codagnone and Boccardelli, such value may result from "financial gains, better empowered employees as well as better organisational and IT structures" (Codagnone & Boccardelli, 2006, p. 3). Several of these features seem to constitute additional objectives of the state startups. Indeed, Matti Schneider argued that "the incubator systemize the constitution of autonomous teams within the administration to improve its efficiency and effectiveness (…).Value is created in the first place for the citizens and organisations and secondly for the administration" (Schneider, 2017). Financial gains are also expected due to the very nature of state startups – small teams with a budget of €200 000. In addition, state startups always start with one civil servant. For example, *La Bonne Boite* (The good company), which helps unemployed people finding companies that recruit in their field of expertise, all started from the idea of a Pole Emploi (France national agency for employment) employee from the small town of Hayange (Pezziardi & Verdier, 2016). In a country where most projects are driven from central administration, far from the civil servants and citizens (Pezziardi & Verdier, 2017), state startups seem to be a good way to empower employees and develop a bottom-up approach. When asked about whether the state startups could be

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[1] Mes-aides.gouv.fr is starting to be more promoted, especially on social networks like Facebook, to enhance the number of users

outsourced once handed over to their target administration, Matti Schneider said they hope they will be maintained within the administration because they want to "help the administrations to be aware that they can do it on themselves", that they have the capacity to do so (Schneider, 2017). He finishes by speaking of a "win-win relationship" for both the administration and the citizens (Schneider, 2017).

4.1.3.   Democracy: political value

Finally, state startups can also deliver political value through "openness, transparency and accountability, and participation". Once again, it seems that the team developing the state startups incubator have such objectives in mind. State startups are under the creative commons regime and most of the source codes of the startups are open. According to Pezziardi and Verdier, this contributes to the common goods, defined as "public goods open to all, cultivated in common by those who uses them" (Pezziardi & Verdier, 2017, p. 30). New values of trust and openness are put at the core of the relationship between the State and its citizens. Finally, far from being short-sighted, the directing team does not see state startups as separate and independent services. For them, they contribute to the development of government as a platform that is "the use of technology—especially the collaborative technologies at the heart of Web 2.0—to better solve collective problems at a city, state, national, and international level" (O'Reilly, 2011, p. 14). Pezziardi and Verdier envision the state startups as a contribution to the strategy of a "state that stimulates and welcomes civic engagement, that favours and uses innovation from the great majority, who guarantees the resources available to all: government as a platform" (Pezziardi & Verdier, 2017, p. 31). Thus, creating political value and contributing to democracy is another aim of the state startups.

4.2. Legitimacy and support

State startups objectives and their expected creation of public value have been exposed before. Nevertheless, once objectives have been identified, public managers need to be supported by their authorizing environment (Moore, 1995). This issue of support is clearly one of the greatest challenges of state startups, which had and still have to face the natural resistance of organizations and administrations. As put by Pezziardi and Verdier, "All institution faces a double legitimacy: the one of the "conservatives", in charge of making it work and guaranteeing its sustainability, for who innovation is a risk ; and the one of the innovators, charged with significatively improving, hence to contest its workings" (Pezziardi & Verdier, 2017, p. 13). State startups and their promoters always had to run up against the system and the difficult

change management in such a big organization as the French administration. If they managed to get support from the central French administration, much remains to do to generalize that kind of services.

4.2.1. A strong political support

State startups began with one service, one mission: data.gouv.fr. It was at first only an *administration de mission* (project administration) and thus had a very specific mission and objectives to reach. Nevertheless, following the election of President François Hollande, it was placed under the authority of the General Secretary for the modernization of public action (SGMAP) which marked a clear political will to enshrine this approach in the long run. Moreover, this pegging gave a new impulse to the mission by enabling it to benefit from an interministerial structure and support (Azoulay, 2014). Henri Verdier underlines the fact that "this startup method is possible thanks to the DISIC and the SGMAP that support us in this approach" (Azoulay, 2014, p. 60). Moreover, this attachment to the SGMAP, an interministerial administration under the direct supervision of the French Prime Minister aimed at modernizing the public administration, gives a lot of autonomy to the incubator (Azoulay, 2014). Additionally, the SGMAP and its high-ranking civil servants can also make the link with the different target administrations. This is a very valuable resource since most of the employees of the incubator come from the private sector and are not familiar with the inner workings of the French administration (Azoulay, 2014). Finally, the support from the French administration can also be seen in the recent legislative developments and especially the 2016 entry into force of the Law for a digital Republic that aims at preparing the state for the digital transition and developing tomorrow's economy (French Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2016).

4.2.2. On the difficulties of 'scaling-up'

If there appears to be a strong support from the central French administration, state startups and their incubator still face legitimacy and support challenges. It remains to engage the "scaling-up of the initiative to engage a real and deep digital transformation of the State" (Pezziardi & Verdier, 2017, p. 7). Moore underlined that the organization must be able "to continually attract both authority and money from the political authorizing environment" (Moore, 1995, p. 71) and money seems to constitute an issue for the future and growth of the incubator and state startups. As highlighted by Pezziardi and Verdier, "for a lack of investment beyond the first successes, almost no startup went beyond the 10% market segment obtained through early users" (Pezziardi & Verdier, 2017). They both regret an outdated conception of IT projects consisting of a high investment at the beginning of the project followed by a sharp

disinvestment at the maintenance phase (Pezziardi & Verdier, 2017). Finally, even if support is clear at the central administration level, sometimes, that kind of support does not exist at sub-levels, be they regional or administrative. *La Bonne boite* is a clear example of that situation: even if a success, several regions did not authorize (as of 2017) the exploitation for public use of specific employment regional data, which prevents the good working of the company-finding service (Pezziardi & Verdier, 2017).

4.3. Operational capabilities

Finally, the third pole of Moore's framework concerns the operational and administrative feasibility of a project. It concerns the manner in which resources are organized to produce the desired outcomes. It is especially here that the startup approach is relevant.

4.3.1. Small, pluri-disciplinary, in-house teams

One of the key and innovative feature of the approach is the specific recruitment of the employees working on the state startups. There is only few permanent members that ensure a sense of continuity (SGMAP, 2017) The rest and most of the employees are recruited only for one specific startup due to their specific skills and are supposed to leave once the project is finished (Figure 3). The recruitment follows an unusual pattern for public jobs. For example, Pierre Pezziardi, entrepreneur, was recruited based on a blog post challenging then Minister for digital economy, that attracted the attention of Henri Verdier (Azoulay, 2014). By adopting this recruitment method, the incubator makes sure it can hire the people with the best skills for the job. Moreover, it enables the target administration to avoid seeing the development of the digital service as an "impossible to drop investment", thereby scrapping off the fear to fail and promoting its capacity to innovate (SGMAP, 2017).

ÉVOLUTION DES EFFECTIFS

Agents DINSIC   Autres agents publics   Indépendant·e·s   Prestataires
DINSIC agents   Other public agents   Independents   External provider

Figure 3 Incubator's workforce evolution (from beta.gouv.fr)

Thus, the incubator is made off small, pluri-disciplinary teams entirely dedicated to the realization of the objective of their own startup within a short timeframe. Finally, of the most determinant feature of the teams in the internalisation of their work. This is fundamental to the incubator as it wants to stay the only 'master' of the service and its evolutions. This leads us to the second innovative feature of state startups, their method.

4.3.2. Agile methods: iteration and users' involvment

Agile methods that rely heavily on an iterative development cycle and clients' involvement are at the core of the incubator's work. The creation of digital services is an iterative process and there is continuous improvement of the product. From the construction stage where a new version of the product is delivered every two weeks to the autonomy phase where there might be some punctual improvements or bug correction, the team in charge of the startup always improves the service (SGMAP, 2017). This is one of the main reason why the development of the project is made in-house and not outsourced. Following Lawrence Lessig's maxim "Code is Law", Henri Verdier knows that mastering the code of digital services is crucial to master its usage (Azoulay, 2014). Developing the code internally enables a quick evolution of the service based on users' feedback, which is necessary in a moving and evolving environment (Azoulay, 2014). They gain back room of manoeuvre that was before constrained by the external provider technical choices and skills (Azoulay, 2014).

Moreover, what is key to delivering public value is the involvement of citizens in the development of digital services. Citizens and organisations are central to that process (Pezziardi

& Verdier, 2017). At the investigation or construction phase, the team determines the needs of the users, based on pilot users input. As opposed to traditional IT projects, there is no specifications from the onset. The lead users are 'recruited' due to their interest for the service, they are in the "target ecosystem" of a service in construction and "volunteer to try and co-construct it" (Schneider, 2017). In the first development stages, the startup team can rely heavily on "guerrilla user testing" (Schneider, 2017) meaning that "user tests are more efficient and less costly with direct contact on the field, with little preparation, rather than in usability labs" (Schneider, 2017). Many tests are conducted on a short timeframe. Then, it might conduct focus groups every two weeks with lead users in the consolidation phase.

What is important to highlight is that each team is autonomous and can choose its technical solutions and means for development (Pezziardi & Verdier, 2017). The incubator offers the team support and a toolbox but since every context is different, no practice is systematic (Schneider, 2017). By focusing on internal, small and pluri-disciplinary teams working along agile methods, the startups incubator aims at delivering the public values exposed before.

5. CONCLUSION

This paper chose to study French state startups through the lens of public value. Due to relative novelty of the state startup approaches, there is only little hindsight on the actual public value delivered and impact-assessment. Thus, this study chose to focus its analysis on the strategy developed by the incubator to deliver public value. After specifying the desired public values to be delivered, with the most important one being the simplification of administrative complexity to the service of the citizens, the study went on by analysing the two necessary pre-requisites to create that value: legitimacy and support as well as operation capabilities. Following this analysis, one can conclude that the digital services incubator have created the right environment and processes to deliver public value, be it user centric, organisational or political (Figure 4).

Figure 4 State startups' strategic triangle

When considering this new method and its impact on public value, Matti Schneider's words resonate (Schneider, 2017):

Because when you focus on operational softwares rather than comprehensive documentation, you have more chances to have an irritating procedure resolved than a simple plan.
Because when you focus on the adaptation to change more than on following a plan, you have more chances to have an irritating procedure resolved than a nice idea that failed.
Because when you focus on the individuals and their interactions more than on processes and tools, you have more chances to have an irritating procedure resolved than a toolbox.
Because when you focus on collaboration more than on contractual negotiation, you have more chances to have an irritating procedure resolved than a steering committee.

With stronger political support for sub-national levels and increased financial support from each administration[2], state startups seem to be on the right track to deliver public value. It cannot be denied that further study on the actual delivery of the expected public values need to be conducted once we have more hindsight. Nevertheless, this study has contributed to the growing literature on e-government reforms and public value, clearly demonstrating that Moore's strategic triangle can prove crucial when designing and studying public policies. If not conscious in the minds of the creators of beta.gouv.fr, the framework helped us bring to light interesting paths to the creation of public value. Thanks to the open code, other public administrations like the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg or the city of Montreal have appropriated state startups and contribute to their co-creation (Pezziardi & Verdier, 2017). Thus, further study could assess the possibilities and relevance of the generalisation of such a process as a mean to create public value.

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[2] It is estimated that 0,1% of the budget of each administration could suffice to implant a radical innovation incubator within this administration (Pezziardi & Verdier, 2017)

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